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"CONSTRUCTING" NATIONS WITHIN STATES:
THE QUEST FOR FEDERAL RECOGNITION
BY THE CATAWBA AND LUMBEE TRIBES

BY ANNE MERLINE MCCULLOCH AND DAVID E. WILKIN

Creating and in some cases re-creating viable tribal politica

nities within the construct of the modern nation-state has pr

troublesome task for indigenous populations worldwide. T

indigenous governments in the United States has been further
by federalism's divisions of power between the states and th
government. Native American tribes often find themselves w
front battle in which they must resist state encroachments over

and their inherent governing authority; while at the same tim

lobby the federal government for protection of those same lands
History is replete with attempts by the federal government

remove tribes from their ancestral and treaty-recognized ho

facilitate assimilation using acts of cultural genocide,2 and to seve

trust relationship with tribes. These often well-intentioned

destructive policies have taken their toll on tribes' political status
resources, and cultural integrity. This is particularly true for ma

tribes, especially those in the mid-Atlantic region, that genera

accorded federal recognition in the form of treaties and thus did

from the accompanying "protection" of the federal trust rela
addition, many Eastern tribes never had reservations set aside

major source of geographic security that many Western tribes ha
Federal recognition is the primary method used by tribes t
their existence as distinct political communities within the Amer

Federal recognition buffers tribal existence from most jurisd
croachments by state and local governments and, ideally, shou
tribes from federal encroachments as well. It also provides tri

members with certain political, legal, and economic benefits. Trib
marginalized and have experienced great difficulty sustaining the

viable political and cultural entities without federal recognitio

This paper will analyze the campaigns for federal recogniti
Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina and the Lumbee Indian Tribe of
North Carolina. The Catawba were successful in their battle to re-establish a

federal relationship when Congress passed legislation in 1993 finalizing the
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settlement between the Catawba tribe and South Carolina. The settlement

transferred responsibility for the tribe and its reservation from South
Carolina to the federal government and also settled a treaty land claim that

had been outstanding since 1840. The Lumbee Tribe, on the other hand, has
been unsuccessful in its quest for complete federal recognition despite efforts

dating to the 1880s.
Our analysis of these campaigns for federal recognition is based on
the thesis that federal recognition is dependent on the tribes' externally and

internally constructed social identities. The model we have chosen in
analyzing this thesis is the policy formulation model recently proposed by
Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram.5 This model uses the socially constructed
identity of a target group or population to analyze and predict the types of
federal policies that will be directed toward that group. Schneider and Ingram
argue that the "dynamic interaction of power and social constructions leads

to a distinctive pattern in the allocation of benefits and burdens to the
different types of target groups."6' Those groups with positive social constructions and with strong levels of power, as defined by the ability to mobilize

resources for action, will be overcompensated and are termed "advantaged
groups." "Contenders" are those groups that are negatively constructed but
have sufficient power to affect policymakers. In the case of the latter group,

public officials "will prefer policy that grants benefits noticed only by
members of the target groups and largely hidden from everyone else."7'
"Dependent groups" are positively constructed but lack sufficient power to
direct political benefits. Finally, "deviants" are both negatively constructed
and are lacking in power, making them susceptible to policy constraints or
even punishments. It is our argument that Native American tribes constructed by the "Anglo" community as "advantaged" or "dependent," i.e., as
having a positive image, will have a greater probability of becoming federally

recognized than those constructed as "contenders" or "deviant."
By examining two Southeastern tribes, each with extensive historical
relations with the United States, we hope to illuminate the factors inherent

in the construction of the tribes' social identity and to determine which
factors seem most critical to federal recognition. Analysis of these factors may
benefit the more than one hundred other tribal groups that are petitioning
the federal government for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

FEDERAL RECOGNITION:

Federal recognition historically has had two distinctive meanings.
Before the 1870s, "recognize" or "recognition" was used in the cognitive
sense. In other words, federal officials simply acknowledged that a tribe
existed." During the 1880s, however, "recognition" or, more accurately,
"acknowledgment," began to be used in a formal jurisdictional sense. Today
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the federal government's acknowledgment is a formal act that establishes a
political relationship between a tribe and the United States. Federal acknowl-

edgment affirms a tribe's sovereign status. Simultaneously, it outlines the
federal government's responsibilities to the tribe.
Federal acknowledgment means that a tribe is not only entitled to the
immunities and privileges available to other tribes, but is also subject to the
same federal powers, limitations, and other obligations of recognized tribes.

What this means, particularly the "limitations" term, is that "acknowledgment shall subject the Indian tribe to the same authority of Congress and the
United States to which other federal acknowledged tribes are subjected."' In
short, tribes are informed that they are now subject to federal, particularly
congressional, plenary power. The doctrine of "plenary power" is one of the

central, yet most problematic, concepts in federal Indian policy and law.'o

Since Indian nations were not and have not been included in the constitu-

tional structure of the United States, the doctrine of federal "plenary power"

has been derived through Supreme Court interpretation of the Indian
Commerce Clause to give to the United States Congress the right to exercise

all but unbridled power over tribal governments, lands, and resources.
Because the power is not within the construct of the Constitution, it is not
limited by it. Constitutional protections (federalism, equal protection, Bill of
Rights) against governmental intrusion into the lives of people do not apply

to Indian governments."
Although Congress traditionally has had recognition authority, in
1978 the Bureau of Indian Affairs developed an administrative process which
unacknowledged tribes were to follow when seeking recognition. This set of

guidelines was based mainly on confirmation by individuals and groups
outside the tribe that members of the group were Indians. The mandatory
criteria were as follows: the identification of the petitioners "from historical

times until the present on a substantially continuous basis, as 'American
Indian' or 'Aboriginal' "'2 by the federal government, state or local governments, scholars, or other Indian tribes; the habitation of the tribe on land
identified as Indian; a functioning government that had authority over its
members; a constitution; a roll of members based on criteria acceptable to the
Secretary of the Interior; not being a terminated tribe; and members not
belonging to other tribes. These criteria largely were designed to fit the
aboriginal image of the existing and recognized western tribes and were
problematic for many eastern tribes that sought recognition."' As M. Annette
Jaimes has complained, some of these requirements presented a catch-22: "An
Indian is a member of any federally recognized Indian Tribe. ... To gain
federal recognition, an Indian Tribe must have a land base. To secure a land
base, an Indian Tribe must be federally recognized."'4
Because of the problematic nature of many of these criteria, and
Congress's impatience with a process that seemed interminable, unfair, and
ponderous, the BIA was forced on February 25, 1994, to issue revised criteria.
AMERICAN INDIAN QUARTERLY/SUMMER 1995/VoL. 19(3) 363
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The new criteria, it is alleged, are more in keeping with the contemporary
condition of tribes seeking federal recognition. For instance, instead of
requiring that the tribe be continuously identified as a distinctive Indian
entity since "historical times," the criteria require only that there has existed
an "American Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis since 1900."'"
Also, the land requirement has been changed to require evidence of a "distinct

community," a broader term that has in its meaning social as well as

geographic ties. It is too early to ascertain the effect of these rules on the
remaining petitioners.
The significance of recognition is two-fold: First, federally recognized tribes are eligible for a number of federal benefits. These benefits
include educational and medical services and exemption from many state
taxes. Second, by recognizing an Indian tribe the federal government is

affirming the legal position of its members as Indians. Without such

recognition, an ethnically identified "Indian" may not be able to benefit from

federal programs tailored for "legally-recognized" Indians. Monroe E. Price
and Robert N. Clinton note that according to the 1982 amended regulations

of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 an Indian is defined as: (1) a
member of a federally recognized tribe, (2) descendants of members of

recognized tribes who were residing on an Indian reservation onJune 1, 1934,

or (3) a person who has one half or more Indian blood.' This definition
entails both an ethnological and a political/legal meaning. As Felix S. Cohen
observed in his classic Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
ethnologically, the Indian race may be distinguished from the
Caucasian, Negro, Mongoloid, and other races. If a person is
three-fourths Caucasian and one-fourth Indian, it is absurd, from
the ethnological standpoint, to assign him to the Indian race. Yet
legally such a person may be an Indian. From a legal standpoint,
then, the biological question of race is generally pertinent, but
not conclusive. Legal status depends not only upon biological,
but also upon social factors, such as the relation of the individual
concerned to a white or Indian community."
Equally pertinent to our discussion is that when the United States deals with
tribes in an intergovernmental way it has done so not on the basis of race, but
on a political basis. This is to say, the United States treats with tribes as social-

political groups towards which it has unique legal/political responsibilities
because of the inherent sovereignty of each party.'"

While Cohen's categorization of four racial groups has a number of
problems scientifically, it remains a pertinent fact that for the purposes of
federal Indian policy and law race coexists uneasily alongside the political basis
(as exemplified in the hundreds of ratified treaties negotiated between tribes
and the European nations and later the United States) as the defining factors
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in the tribal-Western relationship. Price and Clinton and Cohen's definitions

of "Indian" actually raise more questions than they answer. And since the
term "tribe" has similar racial/political connotations, it also is problematic.
For example, to what extent is the federal government's relationship with
tribes based on race? On politics? Does this vary from tribe to tribe? From
administration to administration? Does the United States have a legal and
moral obligation to all indigenous groups, or only to those with whom it has
maintained long-standing political (read: treaty) relations? Does the issue of
"domicile" (geographic location) have any legitimate bearing on the tribalfederal relationship? Finally, should the issue of "federal recognition" be used
to distinguish tribes apart from "state-recognition"? And if so, to what degree?

We argue that the social construction of "Indianness" created by
Euroamericans is among the most critical elements in determining which
tribes will be recognized. What a person or group is perceived to be is just as

much a function of subjective phenomena as of objective phenomena.
Therefore, as we will demonstrate, the concepts of race, rights, obligations,

and even domicile are as much dependent on the social construction put
upon them as on their objective existence. The ability of an Indian tribe to
become and remain a federally recognized tribe is dependent on how well that
tribe "fits" the social construction of "Indian tribe" as perceived by federal
officials.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GROUPS AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY:

The literature on interest groups and public policy is extensive.
Factors such as size and cohesiveness,19 resources,20 social status, 21and
incentives22 have all been analyzed in attempts to explain the differential
success rates of interest groups in policy formulation and implementation.
But until recently the concept of the social construction of group identity has

been overlooked as a factor in public policy analysis. The concept of group
identity may be of little importance in a homogeneous society, in that
everyone in the population has a similar racial, religious, or cultural identity.
In a heterogeneous, pluralistic society, particularly one in which discrimina-

tion based on racial or ethnic identity has been relatively common, group
identity can be critical to the benefits or burdens levied on the group. The
difficulty in addressing the impact of socially constructed identities of groups

in the United States derives from the regime's commitment to liberalism.
Lockean liberalism, upon which the United States Constitution is based,
argues that governments are created to protect the individual natural rights

of "life, liberty and property."23 Liberalism has been an attractive and
successful political philosophy worldwide because it rejects the political
legitimacy of most socially constructed group identities such as class and race.

Yet despite philosophical and constitutional denial of group differences, in
AMERICAN INDIAN QUARTERLY/SUMMER 1995/VOL. 19(3) 365
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practical politics they remain firmly entrenched. Behavioral scientists often
use group identity (e.g. race, religion, gender, etc.) as explanatory factors in

social analysis. The high explanatory power of these "identity" factors
demonstrates their significance for study and discourse about political issues
and theory.

Identity politics is critical to understanding the background and

intent of federal Indian policies. The term "Indian" itself is a social
construction. Historians Robert F. BerkhoferJr.24 and Brian W. Dippie25 both

argue that "Indian" is a social construction created by the European

immigrants to America. According to Berkhofer, "The initial image of the
Indian, like the word itself, came from the pen of Columbus."26 The Arawak
people were described by Columbus as "well built and of handsome stature,"

"marvellously timorous," "so guileless and so generous," and having a "very
acute intelligence," in other words, he crafted the image of the "noble
savage," the innocents of nature extolled by the later Romantic poets and
philosophers.28 Columbus also originated the concept of the hostile and
depraved "red devil" when he described the ferocious and cannibalistic
Caribs. That image was permanently embedded in the European immigrants'
impressions as well. The frontier stories of Indian "massacres" are but later
examples of this same social construction of the indigenous inhabitants of
the Americas.

Dippie maintains that these images served to reflect the moral
dichotomy of Euroamericans' lives. On the one hand, these settlers championed the moral superiority of the civilization they were bringing to the
wilderness and, on the other hand, they mourned the loss of innocence and
virtue that civilization meant. Since the Indian represented the innocence of
the lost wilderness to the white man, the Indian, by definition, could not
continue to exist.29 So the myth of the "Vanishing American" was born.30
Books like The Last of the Mohicans by James Fenimore Cooper and artistic
depictions like The End of the Trail by James E. Fraser helped to cement this
myth into the American culture.
A curious aspect of these constructions was their timelessness. "In
spite of centuries of contact and the changed conditions of Native American
lives,"' Whites picture the 'real' Indian as the one before contact or during the
early period of that contact."32 By creating an image that was "uncivilized"
by European standards, the immigrant Americans were able to define away
any Native Americans who adopted white culture. Federal Indian policy in
the nineteenth century reflected these myths. Indians were removed to
reservations where they were illegally confined until they had become suitably
acculturated so that they could begin "productive" lives in the Euroamerican

political/economic culture.
In the attitudes of federal policymakers of the time, it was thought

impossible for Indians to lead "productive lives" in their homelands.
Reservations were considered little more than temporary detention colonies
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where tribal members languished until such time as the communal land could

be individually allotted. The 1887 General Allotment Act33 was the inaugurating policy which eventually culminated in the allotment of 118 of 213
reservations by 1934, a gross reduction in indigenous land control from 138
million acres to 52 million acres.34 Importantly, most of the land loss was a
result of subsequent amendments to the allotment measure and in the specific
congressional acts which subdivided reservations.35

Alongside allotment, a number of devastating assimilation measures-i.e., federally-funded Christian missionaries, exertions of criminal
jurisdiction over reservation lands and residents, boarding school policies,
among others-were introduced to Americanize indigenous peoples.3" As long
as Indians maintained ties to their tribe or tribal homeland, they were denied

status as "Americans," entitled to the full panoply of federal benefits and
protections. Federal citizenship prior to the 1924 Indian citizenship law37 was

conferred only upon those who accepted an allotment (or who, preferably,
left the reservation altogether). With citizenship, Indians became subject to
state law.38 But even in cases where Indians voluntarily left the reservations"
or where they had received individual land allotments,40 they were still denied
full citizenship rights and benefits because, according to the Supreme Court,

they "remained Indians by race." Although Indians were unilaterally extended federal citizenship in 1924 and have since World War II been at least

nominally integrated into the general Euroamerican political culture, the
myth persists that the only "real Indian" is the "aborigine he once was, or as
they imagine he once was."41

It is important to note that the social construction of indigenous
Americans, involving more than 540 distinctive groups, as "Indians" has
persisted without input from the Native Americans themselves who traditionally, and in many cases still today, regard themselves primarily in terms of

their tribal affiliation rather than in terms of "Indianness" or political
allegiance to the United States or the states. Early European explorers and
settlers homogenized the vastly heterogeneous tribes under the misnomer
"Indians" despite their knowledge of the myriad languages and customs of
the tribes. The rise of the nation-state in Europe made Europeans sensitive to
differences among themselves. This sensitivity, however, was not extended to

non-Western peoples.
Only in the last two decades has there been serious reevaluation of
the concepts of race and ethnicity by the Census Bureau,"42 anthropologists,
and others. For much of the twentieth century, schools taught that there were

three races: Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid. The category Mongoloid
was then divided into two racial groups, Asians and Native Americans. Recent
scientific scholarship categorically demonstrates that physiognomy and skin
color are useless measures of race, and that the concept of race itself is more

a process of self identification and social construction than physical

characteristics. Nevertheless, the ongoing tendency by a number of federal
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agencies to treat Indian tribes monolithically is based on the obsolete and,
more importantly, fictitious concept of "the" mythic, aboriginal Indian.
However, by socially constructing a mythic Indian and then measuring
demands for recognition against it, federal recognition seems more often to

depend on how many Aboriginal traits the petitioning tribe retains in
common with the mythic notion of "Indian" or "tribe."
The social construction of the Aboriginal Indian has "benefited"
Western tribes more than the Eastern tribes. The western tribes (excepting the
Southwestern groups, and their long history of interactions with the Spanish)

had later contact with European culture; thus they have been able to retain
more of their pre-Columbian cultures and much of their ancestral lands. The
Northwest tribes who treated with Great Britain over trade developed quite
different intergovernmental relations than those that evolved between the
British, the colonies, and the Eastern tribes.43 By the time the United States
treated with the Western tribes, the policy of removal (1830s-1840s) was being
replaced by the reservation system. While reserved land had been used by the
British Crown during colonial times, it was not until the 1850s, when the
policy of removal became impossible because of the westward migration of
Americans to Oregon, California, and other Western regions, that the United

States began as a general policy to set aside or "reserve" lands for its
indigenous inhabitants.4 Many eastern Indian communities were biologi-

cally, materially, and culturally transformed by the British and American
experience to the point where they no longer fit the "image" of the "Indian"that is, the western Indian-which by the twentieth century was well ingrained
in the minds of federal policymakers.
Hence, eastern tribes have often had a difficult time convincing the

federal government (and their neighbors) that they remained "indigenous"
and were entitled to comparable recognition and benefits as their western
cousins. In fact, there is evidence45 that the intention of certain federal
lawmakers in the 1930s for narrowing the "blood quantum"46 requirement
from one-half to one-quarter during Indian reorganization was to reduce the

number of Indians eligible for federal services, while maintaining a policy
that the more "primitive" and "ancient" tribes like the Hopi, Navajo, and
Tohono-O'odham needed ongoing federal tutelage in the form of education,
cultural activities, and technical support, to facilitate their gradual assimilation into the American mainstream.

Two additional factors are particularly salient when examining the
persistence of the federal government's efforts in attempting to assimilate
Indians by destroying their cultures and religions. The first is land ownership.

The tribes held lands coveted by the United States and her citizens for

settlement or for their natural resources. In order to legally acquire title to the

land and its attendant resources, federal policymakers, the press, state

governments, railroad interests, and others had to eliminate the Indian title.

It was easier, less expensive, and more moral to do this by allotting
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This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Wed, 11 Dec 2019 14:09:32 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

'CONSTRUCTING' NATIONS

reservations and forcibly assimilating Indians rather than attempting an
extermination policy that would have violated the very principles on which

the United States was founded. Other racial minorities held no comparable
economic leverage/burden to the budding hegemony of Euroamericans.
African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Hispanics were often segregated or

simply denied any chance to assimilate.
The second factor to be considered is the level of group solidarity
exhibited by the Native American tribes. Most tribes were quite cohesive
social, economic, and political units. The national or tribal ties to ancestral
lands and culture of other minority groups within the United States were
generally broken by the immigration process or, in the case of AfricanAmericans, by slavery. Since Native Americans still had some physical power
over their traditional lands, as well as a functioning social and political unit,

the only way to overcome Native Americans' collective resistance was to

eliminate the tribal unit and disperse the individuals. The General Allotment

Act of 188747 and House Concurrent Resolution 10848-the Termination
Resolution-were both attempts by the federal government to accomplish

this.

FACTORS OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION IMPORTANT FOR RECOGNITION:

The above discussion leads us to suggest that the following four
factors are of particular importance in affecting the success or failure of a tribe

to gain federal recognition.

1. How well the tribe and its members meet the social construction of the image of an Indian. The model of social construction
proposed by Scheider and Ingram lends weight to earlier suggestions

that the image policymakers have of a group will have a profound
impact on the policies that are directed toward the group. Since social
constructions continually evolve, we believe the time period in which
recognition is sought will affect both the characteristics of the social
construction and the ability of the tribe to meet that image.49 We
hypothesize that tribes whose members exhibit the most cultural and
physical attributes of the mythic, aboriginal "Indian" will have the
greatest likelihood of being acknowledged with federal recognition.

2. How cohesive is the self-identity of the tribes' members? Selfidentification is a crucial element in the construction of an image by
others. If the tribe has a well-defined social image, it will have a better

chance of projecting that image effectively to others. The more
ambiguity there is in the tribe's self-image, the more room there will
be for projection of traits onto that group by others. We suggest tribes
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that are internally cohesive with a well-developed tribal image will be
more successful in pressing their demands for recognition than those
that are not.

3. The general public's perception of the legitimacy of the

benefits or burdens directed toward a target population. The

moral value of the perceived rewards or punishments are important

here. The more the general public perceives a tribe as legitimately
"Indian" and morally due its benefits, the greater the likelihood of
success. An established record of broken treaties and historically
harsh treatment of tribal citizens lends greater legitimacy to claims
against the system. As Schneider and Ingram note, "Social construc-

tions become part of the reelection calculus when public officials
anticipate the reaction of the target population itself to the policy
and also anticipate the reaction of others to whether the target group
should be the beneficiary (or loser) for a particular policy proposal."50

Since federal recognition provides significant benefits to the tribe
and tribal members, we hypothesize that the tribe's demands for
acknowledgment must be considered legitimate by the general public,
including other Indian tribes, if the tribe is to be successful.

4. What are the tribes resources that can be used in support of
its recognition efforts? Interest group theory would lead us to
predict that factors such as size, wealth, and social status are
positively associated with successful efforts. For tribes that are
alienated from the system," or have been negatively constructed,52
then the use of threats is the most likely lobbying tactic.53 Tribes
constructed as "dependent" have fewer resources to bring to bear in

lobbying efforts but have a positive climate in which to use those
resources. In keeping with interest group theory and Scheider and
Ingram's model, we hypothesize that those tribes with greater
resources, i.e., population, wealth, land, etc., will be more likely to be
recognized by the federal government because they can bring more
resources to the effort of lobbying the Congress.
In the next two sections we will use these factors to analyze the history

of the Catawba and Lumbee campaigns for federal recognition.
CATAWBA TRIBE:

On November 10, 1763, King George III of England ceded the

Catawba Tribe of South Carolina a tract of land "fifteen miles square"
comprising about 144,000 acres in the Treaty of Augusta (Georgia).54 The
Catawba were treated well because they had had a long-term friendship with
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the English that included sending men to fight alongside Colonel George
Washington in the French and Indian War and alongside the English in the
Cherokee War. Though the Catawba were not completely satisfied with the
Treaty of Augusta, it was accepted and became the basis for the Catawba land

claims and recognition demands 230 years later.
European settlers began moving onto the Catawba Reservation
sometime before the Revolutionary War. One of the first European settlers
among the Catawba was Thomas "Kanawha" Spratt II who settled on the land
near present-day Fort Mill about 1761. Though Spratt got along well with his

Catawba neighbors, he soon began selling parcels of the land the Catawbas
had leased him to other non-Indians. Within a few years almost all of the most
fertile tracts within the reservation had been leased to English colonists. In

1782, after boundary disputes arose, the leaseholders agreed to have all the
lands surveyed, platted, and recorded. That same year, the Catawba petitioned
Congress to secure their land so it would not be "Intruded into by force, nor
alienated even with their own consent."55 Not wanting to deal with the tribe,
Congress the following year passed a resolution stating that the British title

over the Catawba Nation had passed into the hands of South Carolina.
Congress recommended that South Carolina "take such measures for the
satisfaction and security of the said tribe as the said legislature shall, in their
wisdom, think fit."''56 Thus the Catawba nation became beneficiaries of a trust
relationship with South Carolina rather than the United States. Ironically, the
Cherokee, who had sided with the British during the Revolutionary War, were

federally recognized and taxes from Fort Mill on the Catawba Reservation
were sent to support them while the Catawba were left to their own resources.

Settlers continued to invade Catawba lands and by the early 1800s
most of their remaining land had been leased. The non-Indian leaseholders
worried about the permanence of their leases, so in 1838 South Carolina
Governor Patrick Noble authorized commissioners to enter into negotiations with the Catawbas for the sale of their land. The Catawbas were willing
to part with full title if the state provided enough money for land acquisition

near the Cherokee in North Carolina. In 1840 the Catawba Nation and the

State of South Carolina entered into the Treaty of Nation Ford. The treaty
provided that the Catawbas would cede the land granted to them under the
Treaty of Augusta in 1763 in return for

a tract of land of the value of $5,000, 300 acres of which is to be
good arable lands fit for cultivation, to be purchased in Haywood
County, North Carolina, or in some other mountainous or
thinly populated region, where the said Indians may desire, and if
no such tract can be procured to their satisfaction, they shall be
entitled to receive the foregoing amount in cash from the state.

The Commissioners further engage that the State shall
pay the said Catawba Indians $2,500 at or immediately after the
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time of their removal, and $1,500 each year thereafter, for the
space of nine years ... 57

Unfortunately, in its haste to remove the Catawba, South Carolina
had neglected to secure North Carolina's permission to have the Catawba
moved to the Cherokee reservation. When the permission was belatedly
requested, North Carolina refused. Some Catawba journeyed to the Cherokee
reservation and did live there for a time but old tribal jealousies and the stress
suffered by the remaining Cherokee as a result of the "Trail of Tears" tragedy

prevented them from making a permanent home with the Cherokee.
Eventually, most of the Catawbas found themselves back on their former soil
but without land or money. The settlement of $2,500 and the annual payment
of $1,500 promised them under the 1840 Treaty were withheld by the state
because the Catawba had returned to the land. The plight of the Catawbas led
South Carolina Indian AgentJoseph White to secure for them in 1843 a tract
of 630 acres near the center of the "Old Reservation."58

South Carolina and the United States continued to try to rid
themselves of the "Catawba problem." During the Removal, Congress
appropriated money in 1848 and again in 1854 in an effort to remove the
Catawba west of the Mississippi. In the meantime, Governor Seabrook of
South Carolina was trying to get the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to
underwrite the outstanding debt of $18,000 owed by South Carolina to the
Catawba. As early as the 1840s the Catawba realized that they had been
defrauded but it was not until the 1880s that the tribe retained lawyers to

investigate their claims against South Carolina. In 1905 the Catawba
launched their legal battle to recover their lands, arguing that the 1840 Treaty
of Nation Ford was null and void because it violated the Indian Nonintercourse

Acts" which required submission of all land transactions involving tribal
lands to Congress.
The tribe had been able to maintain its internal cohesiveness and
social identity throughout the nineteenth century despite the lack of federal

or state protection because of several factors acknowledged by BIA Special
Indian Agent Charles Davis in a report to the agency dated January 5, 1911.60
These factors included, among others, size, tribal organization, religion, and
character. At the time he was writing, ninety-seven individuals lived on or near

the Catawba reservation who were recognized by South Carolina as being
members of the Catawba Tribe. One-hundred and ten individuals were
recognized as members by the tribe, the discrepancy hinging on a matrilineal

descent requirement by the state. Davis noted that the small tribe had not
intermarried much with their white neighbors and not at all with their black
neighbors, thus "[t]he large majority are so nearly full blood as to retain the
Indian characteristics, and by reason thereof they have retained their tribal

life and organization.... This tribe has maintained a tribal organization for
all time, so far as can be ascertained now. And the State [sic] has seemingly
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always recognized their tribal character."6'' Religion was another factor he
discussed as having some impact on the tribe's internal cohesion. Most
Catawba tribal members had converted to the Mormon religion twenty to
thirty years earlier and had continued in that religion during a time when
there were violent activities against Mormons in South Carolina.62 Despite
poverty, lack of schooling, and general neglect by the State, the Catawba tribe
was still regarded by Davis as ranking very high in regard to integrity.6 The

tribe's solidarity, acknowledged both internally and externally, helped to
support the perseverance needed to pursue its legal claims against South

Carolina.

The tribe persisted in its campaign in the courts and in Congress
until 1934 when the South Carolina Legislature passed a resolution recommending that the care and maintenance of the Catawba Indians should be
transferred to the United States. It was not until 1943 that a Memorandum
of Understanding was signed between the tribe, the state, and the Department

of Interior. South Carolina acquired 3,434 acres of farmland for a federal
reservation. The tribe adopted a constitution under the Indian Reorganization Act, and the federal government assumed its trust responsibility over

tribal affairs.64

The Catawba's federal recognition was short-lived. In keeping with
the federal government's termination philosophy instituted in 195365 the
Catawba tribe was approached in 1958 by both the BIA and South Carolina
with a proposal for termination. The BIA agent at the time assured the
Catawba that their long-standing land claim against the state based on the
Treaty of Augusta and the Treaty of Nation Ford (which still had not been
resolved) would be unaffected by the termination. Thus, in 1962 the federal

trust relationship between the United States and the Catawba tribe was
terminated. The 3,434 acre federal reservation was divided up and distributed
to tribal members. South Carolina continued to hold the 640 acre tract from
the 1840 treaty in trust for the tribe. At the time of termination, there were
631 enrolled members.66

The activism of the American Indian Movement in the early 1970s
served to reignite the determination of the Catawbas-and many other tribesto reinstitute claims. The tribe contacted the Native American Rights Fund,
and in 1976 papers were filed with the Department of Interior to recover the

land recognized under the 1763 Treaty of Augusta. Negotiations were

proceeding between the tribe, South Carolina, and the United States when
two events in December 1977 dashed all hopes of resolution. First, the local
paper obtained and published tribal maps identifying specific parcels of land
the tribe and state were considering for a reservation. Threatened non-Indian

landowners quickly organized the Tri-County Landowners Association with
the intention of stopping any settlement by asking Congress to extinguish the
land claim in return for a monetary payment. Second, the increased publicity

of the pending land claims led to demands by nonresident tribal members
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who wanted to join in the action in hopes of securing land, benefits, or both.

Negotiations stalled. The impasse continued until 1980 when the tribe filed

suit in federal district court to recover possession of the 1763 treaty
reservation.

In 1982, SeniorJudge Joseph P. Wilson67 dismissed the Catawb

on the basis that the ten-year state statute of limitations for cl
expired-it being twenty years since the Catawbas' 1962 terminat

Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the decision arguing that termina

not affect the 1763 reservation. The State appealed to the Unit

Supreme Court. In the meantime the Solicitor for the Unit

Department of Justice under the Reagan Administration switched sid
filed an amicus curiae brief in support of South Carolina. The Suprem

reversed the Fourth Circuit by ruling that termination did make
claim subject to state law and then remanded the case to the Fourth
to determine what the impact would be on the tribe's claim.6"
The Fourth Circuit Court in 1989 found that there was still some

standing for the claim. South Carolina law concerning adverse possession of
real property limits claims to ten years when there has been continuous
occupancy of the land by the trespasser, and to twenty years if the land has
changed hands during that period."9 The twenty-year limit (1962-1982) meant
that a substantial amount of the land claimed would still be subject to
litigation since the clock had stopped running on the claim when the tribe
filed suit in 1980. It was estimated that sixty percent of the original 27,000
land owners were still subject to litigation by the tribe. Most real estate
transactions in York County, home of the Catawba claims, were held up

because of the unwillingness of mortgage companies to provide title

insurance.

At this point Congressman John Spratt (a descenden

"Kanawha" Spratt), Governor Carroll Campbell, and Secretary o

Manuel Lujan expressed their interest in a settlement. Neg
again in 1990 and continued through 1991, until South Car

faded after both the Federal District and Appeals Court denied

petition for a class-action suit. It seems South Carolina and
believed they could win the case by outlasting the tribe.

running on the twenty-year statute of limitations (the clock ha

in 1991 when Judge Wilson refused the class-action petit
decided to proceed with its claim, and NARF attorneys bega
to serve papers on 61,767 individual occupants of the dispu
This action prompted immediate interest on the par

Carolina and land holders in renewed negotiations. To facilitate

Congress enacted legislation extending the statute of limi

additional year to October 1, 1993. The tribe establish

September 2, 1993 as the deadline. If agreement had not been r

date, they argued, the summons would be mailed. On Janua
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2399, the Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina Land Claims Settlement
Act of 1993, was introduced into Congress by Congressman John Spratt.
Negotiations were resumed in good faith and on February 20, 1993 the tribe

voted 289 to 42 to accept the settlement.70 Congress passed the act that
summer and the final agreement was signed by South Carolina Governor
Carroll Campbell on November 29, 1994 at the Catawba Reservation."
The settlement provided for the following: The trust relationship
between the Catawba Indian Tribe and the United States would be restored,
the tribe would become a federally recognized tribe, and its members would

be eligible for federal benefits. The United States and South Carolina would
contribute $50 million dollars over a period of five years to be put into five

trust funds: Land Acquisition Trust, Economic Development Trust, Social
Services and Elderly Assistance Trust, Education Trust and a Per Capita
Payment Trust to be managed by the Secretary of the Interior. The tribe was
given ten years to expand the existing reservation to 3,000 acres, plus 600 acres

of wetlands or undeveloped land. Tribal jurisdiction was recognized over
basic governmental powers, including zoning, misdemeanors, business
regulation, taxation, and membership. Tribal membership would be based on

direct descendency from the 1961 Federal Catawba Roll. South Carolina,
however, reserved the right to continue to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
Indians and non-Indians on the reservation. Finally, the tribe was exempted
from the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.72
The victory for the Catawbas was as welcomed as it was incomplete.
Some tribes complained that the Catawbas gave too much of their sovereign
powers to the state. However, after 153 years of negotiation, legislation, and
litigation (the final litigation process having been continuously in the federal

courts for seventeen years), it appeared that the settlement was at least
sufficient. The Catawbas were able to recover their status as a federally
recognized tribe and their land base was expanded and confirmed. The fact
that both issues were so clearly drawn by the long-standing claim and the
cohesiveness of the tribe in pressing that claim helped to cement the
perception that the Catawbas were still a tribe. Conversely, the fact that they

were so acculturated into the Euroamerican system and had lived so long
under South Carolina law negatively affected their ability to reclaim criminal
and regulatory powers from the state. In the areas that the Catawbas managed
to fit the image of the "real" Indian, they were successful; in areas where they
seemed too "westernized" and assimilated, they lost. The losses were sustained

because the claims were not considered legitimate.
LUMBEE TRIBE:

The Lumbee Nation, numbering about 39,000, are a majority of
Robeson County's indigenous population. According to Robert K. Thomas,
the noted Cherokee anthropologist, genetically the Lumbee people (the term
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Lumbee, we shall see shortly, is of recent vintage) are the descendants of
remnants of several small Southeastern tribes: the Hatteras, Saponi, and
Cheraw, who from the 1780s through the 1840s worked their way into
Robeson County where they intermarried and gradually developed a distinc-

tive tribal identity.7 This account of Lumbee origins, however, directly
contradicts the most prominent theory of Lumbee roots that posits that the

Hatteras Indians living on the Outer Banks of North Carolina intermarried
with John White's "Lost Colony" of Roanoke Island sometime in the late
1500s.74 The latest Lumbee "origin" theory asserts that the Lumbees are
primarily descended from the Cheraw Tribe of South Carolina and related
Siouan speakers who were said to have inhabited the area now known as
Robeson County since the later eighteenth century." These conflicting origin
theories have contributed in no small part to some of the identity questions
Lumbees have confronted internally. Since we are focusing, in part, on how
important the federal government's social construction of "Indian identity"

is, we will see that these socio-cultural questions have clearly discernible
political manifestations.
Interestingly, there are six other groups in Robeson County that
insist they also are distinctive political-cultural tribal polities. This tribal
differentiation-the separation of Robeson County's indigenous population
into several politically, though not genetically, disparate groups-and the

ramifications of this segmentation for internal tribal dynamics and

intergovernmental relations is a powerful dynamic affecting the Lumbees'
quest for federal acknowledgment. This is arguably the most persistent
conundrum confronting the county's indigenous population, especially as it
pertains to the tribe's efforts to project a common tribal identity that might
facilitate federal recognition. The Lumbee's leadership understands, in other
words, that it is crucially important for recognition purposes that they be able
to meet, or at least give the appearance of having met, the extant Anglo social
construction of what a "tribe" should appear to be like: that is a tight, fairly

cohesive unit lacking any disruption to their common identity.
The non-Lumbee indigenous population of the county, however, is
less concerned about satisfying the federal government's social construction,
and seems more intent on satisfying the perception of other tribes, particu-

larly established Northeastern tribes like those constituting the Iroquois
Confederacy. This has contributed to the proliferation of disparate organizations-six in all, besides the Lumbee Tribe.7 Most of these groups have
adopted the name Tuscarora as part of their tribal designation, because the
Tuscarora Tribe for several centuries inhabited portions of eastern North
Carolina before they were defeated in battles with North Carolina colonists.
The bulk of the tribe departed for New York in the early 1700s.

Each of these six other groups is pursuing an independent path
toward federal recognition. This is not the forum, however, to detail the
controversial developments leading to this recent proliferation of groups.
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This splintering and the lack of consensus among the competing political, yet

biologically related, groups have made it much more difficult for the
Lumbees or the other groups to secure federal acknowledgment.

This has been most evident since the latest administrative and

legislative recognition began in the late 1980s. Before then, the Lumbee tribe

generally understood itself internally and presented itself externally as a
relatively cohesive people. However, since the formation of the first splinter

group, the Eastern Carolina Tuscarora Organization in 1970, this cohesion
has been shattered. Thus, when the early versions of the Lumbee recognition

bill were introduced in Congress during the 1980s, the measures were
vigorously opposed not only by some other tribes and BIA officials, but also

by the non-Lumbee indigenous groups. The general fear of these tribal
fragments was that they would be subsumed under the Lumbee tribe and
would not be allowed to petition the federal government separately.
This indigenous segmentation also creates uncertainty and confusion among outsiders about Lumbee identity. For instance, the federally
recognized Eastern Band of Cherokee has been a stalwart opponent of
Lumbee recognition. In part, its resistance results from the historical fact that

the Lumbees were misnamed Cherokees of Robeson County by non-Indians
and that at least one segment of contemporary Robeson County Indians still
identifies itself as "Cherokee." Jonathan Taylor, a former Eastern Cherokee

chief, said in testimony against the Lumbee recognition bill in 1988 that
"there are only two Cherokee Tribes; one of them is in North Carolina [the
Eastern Band] and the other one is in Oklahoma [the Cherokee Nation of

Oklahoma].""

Notwithstanding the importance of tribal segmentation, we concentrate on the Lumbee for several reasons: first, the Lumbee tribe dwarfs the

other factions and all other non-recognized Indian tribes; second, the
Lumbees are one of a handful of tribal groups that was informed by the
associate solicitor of Indian affairs of the Department of Interior that they

were precluded from using the administrative process for recognition
established by the BIA in 1978; and third, a focus on the Lumbees is warranted

because their original (1956) acknowledgment legislation arose during the
termination era when the United States unilaterally severed its political
relationship with a number of tribes. The termination years have since been
replaced by self-determination and a majority of the tribes and Indian groups
that were terminated in the 1950s and 1960s have since been restored to

federal status. The Lumbee Tribe remains, politically speaking, frozen in
time-connected to an aberrant federal policy that has since been forcefully
repudiated by the Congress and the executive branch.
The Lumbee Nation, unlike the Catawba Nation, which has had
bilateral political dealings with European nations, the colony (later state) of
South Carolina, and the federal government since the 1700s, has been in
active pursuit of either federal acknowledgment or federal aid for a little more
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than 100 years. The Lumbee's initial contact with the federal government was

in 1888 when the tribe's leadership petitioned Congress for education aid.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs denied the tribe's request on the grounds

that North Carolina already was providing some money for the Indians'
education and because the BIA maintained that it did not have enough money

to meet the "recognized" tribes' needs.
And unlike the Catawba, who had long-standing dealings with South

Carolina from the colonial period, the Lumbees relations with North
Carolina were of a more recent vintage. This is the result of several factors.
The Lumbees were a relatively small and powerless tribe during the formative
years when the colonial, later state government, was evolving. The Lumbees'
predecessors settled in an area of North Carolina that enabled them to avoid
prolonged contact with colonial/state government. They largely were ignored
by the federal government because they posed no military threat to the United
States or American settlers, they did not inhabit lands deemed desirable, and
they were perceived to have been an incorporated tribe in relation to the state's

political and economic infrastructure.
Collectively, the Lumbee tribe had few formal political dealings with
the state before the 1860s. This era of nonpolitical relations began to change

after the Civil War when the legislature enacted a law that provided for
separate white and Negro schools. The Lumbees then sought political redress

from the state because they were denied admittance to white schools and
refused to send their children to Negro schools."
Gradually, the county's Democratic leadership, became aware of the
tribe's growing voting potential. North Carolina's response was enactment of

a law in 1885 which acknowledged the Lumbee as the Croatan Indians of
Robeson County. What this law did was establish a separate school system for

tribal members. The Lumbees (Croatans) were able to parlay their growing
political clout into additional state legislation that established the Croatan
Normal School, which was under exclusive Indian control.

By the early 1900s, the term Croatan had attained a pejorative
connotation, with local whites often shortening it to "Cro," short for "Jim

Crow," the vernacular term for institutionalized racial segregation. The
Croatans perceived this as a racial slur and requested a different tribal name.

In 1911 the legislature enacted a law that deleted the now-despised word

"Croatan" and simply inserted the generic term "Indian." They were

henceforth to be known as "Indians of Robeson County."

This terminology proved unsatisfactory as well and, in 1913, anxious
to be defined culturally and socially as distinct from others, they were given

yet another name. This time they were designated as "Cherokee Indians of
Robeson County." This resulted from the contention of some historians and

anthropologists who argued that some western North Carolina Cherokees
had intermarried with the Indians of Robeson County during the Revolu-

tionary War.79
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Officially, the "Cherokee" designation remained on the state's
statute books, and over the Eastern band of Cherokees' strenuous objections,
until the 1950s, when the name Lumbee was adopted. In the early 1930s, there
had been another legislative push, this one on the federal level, to rename the

Robeson County Indians. The term bandied about was "Cheraw," an

historical tribe inhabiting north-central South Carolina. Research on the
Cheraw connection was conducted by the noted anthropologist Dr. John P.
Swanton of the Smithsonian Institution. At the time it was the most
historically accurate and detailed to date. Swanton argued that the Indians of

Robeson County were "descended mainly from certain Siouan Tribes of
which the most prominent were the Cheraw and Keyauwee.8"" He proposed
the name "Siouan Indians of Lumber River." This measure, however, was
opposed by the BIA who argued that it would entitle the tribe's fairly
substantial membership to federal services. Ultimately the measure was

tabled.

In the early 1950s, a campaign was begun by several prominent local

Indians to have the tribe's name changed again. The Reverend Doctor F.
Lowry, the leader of this movement, argued that because the tribe was
comprised of members from various tribes, no single historical name was
appropriate. He suggested that the tribe adopt a more geographically-based

name. The name chosen was "Lumbee," which was derived from the Lumber

River that flows through the county. In 1953 North Carolina enacted a law
designating the people as the "Lumbee Indians of North Carolina.""' This law
often is interpreted as an extension of "recognition," but a credible case can
be made that the state still had not explicitly defined the services to which the
tribe was entitled, the immunities to which recognition entitled the tribe, and
the aspects of self-government the state was willing to acknowledge.82
After the Lumbees were acknowledged by North Carolina, they then
launched their drive for federal recognition. Three years later, onJune 7, 1956,

Congress passed "An Act Relating to the Lumbee Indians of North Carolina."8- The federal law used language nearly identical to that of the state law.
However, at the request of the Department of Interior-the agency spearhead-

ing the national termination policy-an exclusionary clause was inserted
providing that "nothing in this Act shall make such Indians eligible for any
services performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as

Indians, and none of the statutes of the United States which affect Indians
because of their status as Indians shall be applicable to the Lumbee Indians."84
Ironically, then, the 1956 federal law acknowledged the Lumbees as
a distinctive tribe, yet simultaneously precluded them from the federal
services and protection generally provided to other acknowledged tribes. In
other words, the tribe was recognized and terminated in the same legislation.
The Lumbees made several sporadic efforts to have the restrictive
language excised in the 1970s, all to no avail. It was not, however, until 1988
that the tribe decided to go full speed for the establishment of diplomatic
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relations. Bills have been introduced in every Congress since then to extend
the full range of federal benefits and sanctions to the Lumbee tribe. To date,
each bill has been defeated.

While the end to the Lumbee's quest is closer than ever (the House
in 1993 passed the measure), there are no guarantees that it will be enacted
anytime soon with the Republicans steering Congress toward less government and lower federal expenditures. The overwhelming preponderance of
evidence suggests that the Lumbee tribe meets most of the ethnological and

legal-political criteria that the federal government uses to determine the
Indian groups to which it has obligations. Yet it retains a nebulous status as

a quasi-recognized tribe.

ANALYSIS OF RECOGNITION FACTORS:

In this last section we return to our social construction model and
comparatively assess the political "success" of the Catawbas, in contrast to the

political "defeats" of the Lumbees.
Social Construction of the Tribe:

There have been nearly 300 years of relations between the Cataw
Tribe, South Carolina and the United States. Since before the French a
Indian Wars, South Carolina has had formal government-to-governm
relations with the Catawbas. Although the state had tried several times

terminate the relationship, the social construction was one of an established
Indian tribe.
On the other hand, the major argument used by Lumbee opponents

is their contention that the Lumbee "lack" certain "genetic" and "cultur

features which other recognized tribes are said to possess. Thomas noted th

in his 1980 study and said that many local whites and some other tri

express the opinion that Lumbees are not "real" Indians. In other words, th
are perceived as not being a "pure genetic race, they do not have a distincti

aboriginal language, and they lack a 'distinct tribal religion.'""' This i
perception that dates back to the nineteenth century and continues to
even when contradicted by solid historical, anthropological, and politic
evidence. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the Lumb

"present themselves as members of different tribes [i.e. the six other India

groups in the county], which causes some confusion on the part of ma

Indians of other tribes.""'

Karen Blu's 1980 study, The Lumbee Problem: The Making of a

American Indian People,87 which focused on the political and legal history o

the Lumbees, essentially argued that Lumbee political activities have b

affected by the "interplay between their own and others' conceptions of w
they are."""88 More importantly, her work posited that Lumbee ethnic ident
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which is a blend of several tribes with an unquantifiable but discernible
amount of Euroamerican and African-American ancestry-by "lacking what
are thought to be 'traditional' Indian customs and traits, that Indianness is
based in an orientation toward life, a sense of the past, 'a state of mind.' It
is a way of doing and being that is 'Indian,' not what is done or the blood
quantum of the doer.""" This unique brand of indigenous identity is a central
factor that has precluded the Lumbee people from securing federal acknowledgment.

Additionally, because the Lumbees did not sign treaties with colonial, state, or federal powers (political recognition), and since they have never

inhabited a reservation (territorial dimension), these factors are sometimes
weighed against them as further evidence that the Lumbees are not a
legitimate tribe.
Social cohesiveness:
There are at least three factors contributing to the maintenance of

continued social cohesion of the Catawba tribe. First, outsiders accord
tribe legitimacy. Second, importance has been placed on continuing

traditional cultural arts of the tribe, particularly pottery from the clay of
Catawba River bottoms, despite having lost title to most of the land wher
the clay is found. The Catawba are the only Eastern tribe to have continu
uninterrupted, pottery making using the traditional designs and the same
used by their ancestors. One tribal member credited the survival of the t
during the Great Depression to pottery, as it was the only income-produc

activity the tribal members had during that period." The third factor

religion. Although the Catawba were exposed to Christian missionaries sin
the early 1700s, it was not until Mormon missionaries approached the

in the 1880s that many Catawba converted to Christianity. A report f

1934 noted that ninety-five percent of the 300 tribal members participat

Mormon services. The Mormon affiliation contributed to social cohes

through church participation, a banding together for protection, and a se

of uniqueness."

The fact that the Lumbees are a melange of several tribes appears
be an inherent weakness in their social cohesion from the federal governme

perspective. The recognition process seems to prefer tribes with a l
historical track record, even though it was European colonization th

scattered the original tribes and destroyed their internal governing structu

Nevertheless, the Lumbees have developed, over a relatively short peri

time, a fairly strong internal cohesion. However, the contemporary fragm

tation which has erupted within the tribe has caused severe intertriba
intergovernmental problems.
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Perception of the Legitimacy of Tribal Benefits:
The United States history of severed treaties and broken promises
with American Indian tribes has generated a reservoir of sympathy toward
Indians. In the case of the Catawbas, the failure by South Carolina to live up

to its treaty obligations was well-documented and contributed to public
empathy for the Catawbas. The major roadblock toward resolution of the
claim was the time that had elapsed and the number of people involved in
the claim as a result of the centuries of inequitable treatment. But as Justice
Blackmun stated in his dissent in South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe:

When an Indian Tribe has been assimilated and dispersed
to this extent-and when, as the majority points out, thousands of
people now claim interest in the Tribe's ancestral homeland...
the Tribe's claim to that land may seem ethereal, and the manner
of the Tribe's dispossession may seem of no more than historical
interest. But the demands of justice do not cease simply because a
wronged people grow less distinctive, or because the rights of
innocent third parties must be taken into account ... I agree with
Justice Black that "[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep
their word.92

The perception of the legitimacy of the Lumbee claim for benefits,
on the other hand, is problematic for the reasons listed above. Although the

tribe has garnered a great deal of support over the years, there is still the
perception that the Lumbees simply have not fared as poorly as tribes with
whom the United States negotiated and then subsequently broke treaties. In

other words, while the Catawba have been seen as weak and dependent, the
Lumbee are often perceived as strong contenders. Their large population size,
relative to other tribes, also makes it more difficult for the Lumbees to gain

the sympathy of non-Indians and western tribes who believe that the
Lumbees' needs are not as legitimate as those of other tribes because they have
not suffered the historical humiliations of tribes like the Catawbas.
Economic Resources:

The Catawbas are a small and relatively poor tribe. In 1980 th
only 953 enrolled members. The tribe had no other resources than it
reservation. Yet it had an unresolved land claim stemming from the

Treaty in 1763. Ultimately, it was that claim that provided the l
obtain federal recognition, as well as a substantial cash settlemen
The Lumbee, by contrast, are the largest non-federally re
tribe, and they are in the top five among all tribes in populat
elements of large population and the estimated costs of serving
membership have been used as evidence by the BIA on many occ
oppose the Lumbees' legislative attempts at recognition. In 189
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commissioner Thomas J. Morgan responded to the Lumbee request with the
following statement:
While I regret exceedingly that the provisions made by

the State of North Carolina are entirely inadequate, I find it quite
impractical to render any assistance at this time.... So long as
the immediate wards of the government (some 36,000 Indian
children) are so insufficiently provided for, I do not see how I
can consistently render any assistance to the Croatans or any

other civilized tribes.94

Testifying in 1988, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs Ross Swimmer

(Cherokee), said a major reason for the administration's opposition to
Lumbee recognition was "the sheer [financial] impact, which is estimated to

be $30 to $100 million per year."" BIA officials have been quoted as saying

that if it had not been for the size of the tribe, the Lumbees would have been
recognized long ago.96
On the first three factors our original hypotheses hold. It is only on
the last factor the hypothesis was contradicted. It was the very size and wealth
of the Lumbee tribe that in the end helped defeat its demand for recognition.
The findings have import for interest group theory and the newly emerging

work in identity politics, in that the factors surrounding how tribes are
socially constructed have in this area of public policy at least as much and
perhaps more significance than traditional measures of power such as size,
wealth, and economic resources.

CONCLUSION:

This preliminary research97 and the social construction theory
applied within it is intuitively understandable to indigenous nations, their
citizens, and their political representatives. Tribal groups have known for the

better part of nearly two centuries that Americans, particularly AngloAmericans, harbor well-defined, if inherently contradictory ideas about who
is an "Indian," and what constitutes a "tribe." In fact, indigenous groups have

sometimes been able to manipulate the competing social constructions to
gain tangible benefits (i.e., the Hopi in their long-standing battle with the
Navajo Nation over disputed territory in Northern Arizona, effectively
parlayed the image many Anglos have of them as a small, surrounded, and
still largely "traditional" people in the grips of the Navajo, a numerically
superior and somewhat less "traditional" people, to wrest substantial congres-

sional victories vis-a-vis the Navajo Nation.)
Thus, the core political question of"Who gets what, when, and how?"
is a reciprocal process in which tribes are far from passive recipients of power-
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driven policymakers. Of course, federal lawmakers control not only the purse

strings, but the recognition string as well. Therefore, their decisions have
greater weight in terms of the benefits to be dispensed or withheld. Moreover,

federal policymakers are not above manipulating their constructs of Indian
tribes though the motivations and goals vary from person to person and
agency to agency. And while tribes today are in a better position to respond
practically and quickly to such image orchestrations, they remain tenuously
situated and are overly dependent on the good will ofWashington lawmakers
to make sound policy decisions since they lack lobbying clout.
By adding the concept of social construction to interest group theory
we have been able to more completely analyze the factors associated with
federal recognition. We are not suggesting that interest group theory is
unimportant. On the contrary, the ability of the Catawba Tribe to use
economic resources in the form ofa land claim to apply pressure to the system
was the catalyst that eventually led to their success in Congress. The sheer size
of the Lumbee Tribe, and the implications of that size for the federal budget,
has been a critical factor in the denial of their petition. Nevertheless the social
construction of each tribe presents the image and framework within which

those factors are addressed and at least in these cases is the more powerful
determinant. The social construction of the Catawbas as a historic Indian

tribe with an outstanding claim against South Carolina lent legitimacy to
their petition. On the other hand, the petitions of the Lumbees, despite more

resources, have been denied because the social construction of the tribe has
not as yet been seen by either the federal government, or for that matter
enough other recognized Indian tribes, as legitimate.
Social constructions of tribes-particularly of so-called non-recognized tribal groups-which are overtly prejudicial, based on archaic understandings, or simply steeped in wrong-headed and pseudo-scientific language,
must be counteracted with balanced, historically based, accurate information
so that intertribal and intergovernmental decisions as important as the

extension of diplomatic relations are made ini full view of the facts and not
in the shadows of lingering stereotypes.
NOTES

1. See, e.g. Grant Foreman, Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of

Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press).
2. See, e.g., Helen Hunt Jackson, A Century ofDishonor, reprint ed. (Norman, OK:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1995, originally published in 1881); and K. Tsianina Lomawaima, They
Called it Prairie Light: The Story of Chilocco Indian School (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,

1994).
3. See, e.g., Donald Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960

(Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1986).
4. See, e.g., J. Anthony Paredes, ed. Indians of the Southeastern United States in the Late
Twentieth Century (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1992).

5. Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations:
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6. Ibid., p. 337.
7. Ibid., p. 338.
8. See William Quinn, Jr., "Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes? The
Historical Development of a Legal Concept," The American Journal ofLegal History 34 (October
1990):331-363.
9. 56 Federal Register 47, 325 (1991).

10. See David E. Wilkins, "The U.S. Supreme Court's Explication of 'Federal Plenary
Power:' An Analysis of Case Law Affecting Tribal Sovereignty, 1886-1914," American Indian Quarterly,

vol. 18, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 349-368.
11. The Indian Civil Rights Act (1968), which incorporates most of the protections of the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, was passed by Congress to protect tribal members
from tribal government, but does nothing to protect tribal governments from the federal government.
The fears of the Founding Fathers against an all-powerful, centralized government have been realized
in federal Indian policy through the "plenary power" doctrine.
12. 25 C.F.R. 83.7 (a)-(g) (1991).
13. See, e.g., Terry Anderson, "Federal Recognition: the Vicious Myth," American Indian
Journal (May 1978): 7-19; Russel Lawrence Barsh, "Dialogue on Federal Acknowledgment of Indian
Tribes: A Challenge to Anthropologists," Practicing Anthropology, vol. 10, no. 2 (1988); 2, 20-21; and
Susan D. Greenbaum, "In Search of Lost Tribes: Anthropology and the Federal Acknowledgment
Process," Human Organization, vol. 44, no. 4 (1985): 361-367.
14. M. Annette Jaimes, "Indian Identification Policy," Native Americans and Public Polity,
eds. Fremont J. Lyden and Lyman H. Legters, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), pp.
125-126.

15. Federal Register Vol. 59 (February 25, 1994), p. 9295.
16. Monroe E. Price and Robert N. Clinton, Law and the American Indian: Readings, Notes

and Cases 2nd ed. (Charlottesville, VA: The Michie Company, 1983), p. 62. See also Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. 479 (1976, 43 Fed. Reg. 2393 (1978), 25 C.F.R. 51 (1982). Indian Country,
according to 18 U.S.C.A. 1151 (1948), is (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within
the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
17. Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1972 reprint (Albuquerque, NM: Univ.

of New Mexico Press), p. 2.
18. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
19. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Schocken Books, 1971); Roger
V. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics ofAgenda Building

(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972).
20. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (London: Oxford University Press, 1956).

21. G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America (New York:
Vintage Books, 1971); Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America: The Bush Era, 5th ed. (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990); E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of
Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).
22. James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
23. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988).
24. Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man's Indian: Images of theAmerican Indian from
Columbus to the Present, (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).

25. Brian
W. Dippie,
Vanishing
American: White Attitudes &. US. Indian Polity,
(Lawrence, Kansas:
University
of KansasThe
Press,
1982).
26. Berkhofer, p. 5.
27. In Cecil Jane translation revised by L. A. Vineras, The Journal of Christopher Columbus

(London: Hakluyt Society, 1960), pp. 194-200, as quoted in Berkhofer, p. 6.
28. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or Concerning Education (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1983);
Francois-Rene Chateaubriand, Atala; Rene; Les Adventures du denier Abercerage (Paris: Gallimass, 1971).
29. See Alexis de Tocqueville, "The Three Races in the United States," Democracy in America
Vol. I (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), pp. 343-452. de Tocqueville, like his contemporaries, believed
that the Indian (culturally and physically) was doomed to death by civilization.
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30. Dippie, 18-24.
31. Since the 1890s, the Native American population has been growing, not diminishing, a
fact which those who subscribe to the myth of the "Vanishing American" conveniently overlook.
Marlita A. Reddy (ed.), Statistical Record of Native North Americans, (Detroit, Mich.: Gale Research, Inc.,
1993), pp. 9, 232.
32. Berkhofer, p. 28.
33. 24 St. 388.

34. Janet A. McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887-1934 (Bloomington,

IN: Indiana University Press, 1991): 10.
35. The following is an inexhaustive list of some of the most important specific amendments to the Allotment Act and a number of tribal specific allotment agreements: Act of February 28,

1891 (26 St. 794); Act of August 15, 1894 (28 St. 305); Act of March 2, 1895 (28 St. 900) Act of June
10, 1896 (29 St. 340); Act of June 7, 1897 (30 St. 85); Act of May 31, 1900 (31 St. 229); Act of March
1, 1901 (31 St. 861); Act of June 30, 1902 (32 St. 500); Act of May 8, 1906 (34 St. 182-The Burke Act);
Act of June 21, 1906 (34 St. 326); Act of June 28, 1906 (34 St. 855); Act of June 25, 1910 (36 St. 855);
Act of September 21, 1922 (42 St. 995); and Act of February 21, 1931 (46 St. 1202).
36. See, e.g., Henry Fritz, The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890 (Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963); Francis P. Prucha, American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian
Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976); and Janet
McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887-1934 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1991).
37. 43 St. 253.

38. See Article I Sec. 2 and Amendment XIV Sec. 2 of the United States Constitution.
39. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
40. U.S. v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909); U.S. v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
41. Berkhofer, p. 29.
42. Dvora Yanow, "American Ethnogenesis, Policy Judgment, and Administrative Action,"
Democracy and Difference, eds. Carol Greenhouse and Davydd Greenwood (Albany, NY: State University
Press of New York, forthcoming).
43. See. Howard Peckham and Charles Gibson, eds. Attitudes of Colonial Powers Toward the
American Indian (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1969). While a number of tribes, in the
Southwest and Florida, had significant contact with the Spanish, those colonial relations were less
invasive than relations in the British colonies.
44. See, Robert A. Trennert Jr., Alternative to Extinction: Federal Indian Policy and the
Beginnings of the Reservation System, 1846-1851 (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1975).

45. See, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 2755 and S.
3645, Part 2, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington, D.C..: Government Printing Office, 1934): 266.
46. The "blood quantum" standard, with historical (mid-13th century) roots in feudal
English common law surrounding the inheritance of personal property, was originally known as the
"parentelic system." It was devised by European lawyers as a means of determining heirship to a
man's landed estate. The first congressional use of a specific blood-quantum, was a 1908 law which
declared that the allotment of any deceased tribal member of the Five Civilized Tribes of "one-half or
more Indian blood," would remain protected provided the Secretary of Interior did not arbitrarily lift
trust restrictions. (35 St. 312, 315). Section 3 of this statute acknowledged that the Secretary of
Interior's approval of tribal rolls was to be "conclusive evidence as to the quantum of Indian blood of
any enrolled citizen or freedmen..." (Ibid., p. 313).
Four years later, in 1912, Congress, in an effort to cut federal expenditures for Indian
education programs, established a one-quarter blood degree limit (37 St. 518). This act excluded from
day and industrial schools Indian children with less that one-quarter Indian blood. By 1917, when
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells introduced his "New Policy," degree or quantum of blood
"betrayed a deep-seated, racially-defined perception of Indian peoples' corporal physical bodies as

'uncivilized"' (Lomawaima, 1994: 82).
Blood quantum criteria since this era have been one of the most utilized, if problematic,
scales for determining tribal membership/citizenship and Indian eligibility for tribal, federal, and in
some cases, state social services.

47. Ch. 119,24 Stat.388; 25 U.S.C. Sect. 331.
48. Ch. 732,68 Stat. 718, codified at 25 U.S.C. Sect. 564 et. seq.
49. For an excellent discussion on the impact of time on policy making see: Richard E.
Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: The

Free Press, 1986).
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(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
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Contact through the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp.
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63. Ibid., p. 798.
64. Don B. Miller, "Catawba Tribe v. South Carolina: A History of Perseverance," NARF
Legal Review, Vol. 18 (Winter/Spring 1993), pp. 5-6.
65. 67 St. B132.

66. Reddy, Statistical Record of Native North Americans, p. 215.
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68. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498 (1986).
69. S.C. Code Ann 15-3-370, 15-67-210 (1976).
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72. H.R. 2399.

73. A Report on Research of Lumbee Origins (Unpublished Manuscript, 1980). Authors have
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74. See Adolph Dial and David K. Eliades, The Only Land I Know, (San Francisco: Indian
Historian Press, 1975).
75. Jack Campisi, The Lumbee Petition (Pembroke, NC: Lumber River Legal Services, 1987).
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Tuscarora Indian Tribe of Drowning Creek Reservation, Tuscarora Tribe of North Carolina, Eastern
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Carolina: Issues for the '80s, ed. Susan M. Presti (Raleigh: North Carolina Center for Public Policy
Research, 1981), p. 56.
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85. Thomas, A Report on Research of Lumbee Origins, (1980), p. 63.
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